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SUMMARY
This report presents an approach to identifying high-reliability and low-
mass space powerplant conceptual designs that are based on emerging or
advanced technologies which have little or no reliability data base. The
approach consists of estimating a range of expected unit reliabilities, or
failure rates, for these emerging technology elements to determine the impact
of varying the unit failure rates and of applying redundancy at various system
levels on the overall reliability of powerplant designs. When combined with
powerplant mass estimates, the resulting matrix can be used to characterize
and select attractive powerplant design options as a function of the expected
reliability of the emerging technologies.
The study applied this methodology to a lunar-base powerplant concept
based on emerging SP-100 reactor heat source technology and Stirling cycle
power-generation technology. A range of reactor and power-generation unit
reliability estimates was arbitrarily selected to allow for the uncertainty
inherent in these emerging technologies, but only the boundaries of this range
were used in the analysis. Reliability estimates of reactor and power-
generation subsystem units ranged from low, or pessimistic, values of 0.90 and
0.80, respectively; to high, or optimistic, values of 0.98 and 0.95.
A total of 80 lunar-base powerplant designs were investigated. These
powerplants incorporated redundancy at two different levels, and each power-
plant was required to produce at least 800 kWe to meet an assumed mission
success criterion. Design redundancy options at the highest system level
included four different powerplant configurations:
(I) A nonredundant single system producing 800 kWe
_2) Two nonredundant 400-kWe systems operating in series to deliver
800 kWe
(3) Two fully redundant 800-kWe systems operating in parallel
(4) Three partially redundant 400-kWe systems operating in a two-out-of-
three mode
At the lowest system level (the reactor and power-generation subsystem units),
the powerplants had one of twenty different design redundancy options. Reac-
tor subsystems were either single (nonredundant) or dual (fully redundant)
parallel reactor units. Power-generation subsystems were composed of one to
nine partially redundant (k-out-of-n) parallel power-generation units includ-
ing up to two spare units.
As a result of this study some interesting perspectives on the charac-
teristics and selection criteria of high-reliability and low-mass lunar-base
powerplant design configurations have emerged. For example, as expected, the
wide range of emerging-technology reliability estimates used had a significant
effect on the selection of high-reliability and low-mass design configura-
tions, powerplant designs that provided high reliability with low mass when
optimistic emerging technology reliability estimates were assumed were gener-
ally unacceptable when pessimistic reliability estimates were substituted.
Therefore, to ensure acceptable powerplant reliability, one should select
minimum mass configurations on the basis of pessimistic reliability estimates.
Another interesting result of the study was that for either low or high
unit reliability estimates, the best combination of high powerplant reliabil-
ity and low mass occurred when redundancy was applied at the lowest level of
system hierarchy. Thus, the most attractive powerplant design concepts were
nonredundant single-system powerplants with subsystem-unit redundancy options.
Selection of the best redundancy option for the subsystem units, however,
depended on the definition of an acceptable overall powerplant reliability
criterion.
The issue of defining an acceptable overall powerplant reliability cri-
terion was addressed, and the definition of this criterion significantly
affected the selection of the best subsystem unit redundancy configuration.
Since the calculated overall reliability of any powerplant configuration is
highly dependent on the emerging technology reliability estimates, powerplant
reliability is a relative value. Therefore, an acceptable reliability cri-
terion must be defined on the basis of emerging technology reliability
estimates. The reasonable choice appeared to be an acceptable reliability
criterion that required the overall powerplant reliability to be equal to, or
better than, any emerging technology subsystem unit reliability estimate.
However, that selection required every acceptable powerplant configuration to
have two fully redundant, parallel reactor units. Although dual reactors do
not impose a significant mass penalty, they may require integration and oper-
ational considerations that were not fully explored in this study. Therefore,
selecting an attractive powerplant design on the basis of an arbitrary relia-
bility criterion may involve a tradeoff with design or operational complexity
as well as with mass.
Additional perspectives into selecting the best redundancy options for
the subsystem units were gained by analyzing the effect of varying the overall
powerplant reliability criterion with estimates of emerging technology reli-
abilities. For example, with pessimistic emerging technology reliability
estimates and a corresponding reliability criterion of approximately 0.90 or
better, the lowest mass 800-kWe powerplant configuration consisted of a single
800-kWe system composed of two fully redundant, parallel reactor units coupled
to a total of six parallel, partially redundant 200-kWe power-generation
subsystem units, of which two are spares. This configuration provided a
powerplant reliability of 0.8921 at a mass of 26 660 kg. If higher overall
powerplant reliabilities are desired, and additional mass is acceptable, fewer
power-generation units are needed. For example, a decrease to five 267-kWe
power-generation units, including two spares, provides a powerplant reliabil-
ity of 0.9327 at a mass of 28 320 kg, and a further decrease to four 400-kWe
power-generation units, including two spares, provides the highest single-
system powerplant reliability of 0.9631 at a mass of 32 340 kg.
For optimistic emerging technology reliability estimates and a corre-
sponding reliability criterion of 0.98 or better, the lowest mass powerplant,
again, consisted of a single-system 800-kWe configuration. However, this
configuration had two fully redundant reactor units coupled to nine 167-kWe
power-generation units, including two spares. This configuration provided a
powerplant reliability of 0.9898 at a mass of 25 060 kg. Decreasing the num-
ber of power-generation units again provides higher powerplant reliability at
the expense of mass, up to a maximumof 0.9991 at a massof 32 340 kg for a
four-unit power-generation subsystem, including two spares, with each unit
rated at 400 kWe.
Reducing the acceptable reliability criterion to, say, the reliability of
the lowest emerging technology subsystem unit allows single-unit reactor
subsystems to be selected with a resultant powerplant massdecrease. For
example, with pessimistic emerging-technology reliability estimates and a
corresponding reliability criterion of approximately 0.80 or better, the low-
est mass configuration was a single-system powerplant composedof only one
reactor unit coupled to six parallel, partially redundant 200-kWepower-
generation subsystem units including two spares. This configuration provided
a powerplant reliability of 0.8110 at a mass of 23 360 kg. If higher power-
plant reliabilities are desired, a wide range of single unit reactor subsystem
options are viable up to a reliability criterion of about 0.84.
For optimistic emerging technology reliability estimates and a corre-
sponding reliability criterion of 0.95 or better, the lowest mass conceptual
design was a single-system powerplant composed of one reactor unit coupled to
five 200-kWe partially redundant power-generation units with one spare. This
configuration provided a powerplant reliability of 0.9578 at a mass of
21 390 kg. If higher powerplant reliabilities are desired, a wide range of
single-unit reactor subsystem options are viable up to a reliability criterion
of about 0.98.
The perspectives developed in this study provided valuable insight into
the considerations required to identify and characterize high-reliability and
low-mass lunar-base powerplant designs. In general, this methodology can pro-
vide similar reliability perspectives for any space power mission designs
based on emerging technologies with unknown reliabilities.
INTRODUCTION
As part of NASA's efforts to provide viable options for carrying out a
focused program of human exploration of the solar system, its Office of
Exploration (now absorbed into the NASA Office of Aeronautics and Exploration
Technology) desired to establish a knowledge-based understanding for a selec-
tion rationale. A series of illustrative cases and tradeoffs were studied to
develop conceptual point designs and technical requirements and to understand
the driving technology factors and operational considerations in choosing
options. One pathway of human exploration was encompassed in a hypothetical
lunar evolution case study. A permanent facility, with significant capabil-
ities for operations, research, and self-support, would be established on the
lunar surface. Then, lunar resources, including propellants, would be devel-
oped and exploited to reduce support requirements from Earth. Ultimately,
these permanent facilities would be developed for expanded lunar operations
and scientific activities to support expansion of the human presence into the
solar system.
In its role assigned by the NASAOffice of Exploration as the Special
AssessmentAgent for power and propulsion, the NASALewis Research Center
developed a conceptual design to assess integration and operational issues for
a proposed lunar-base powerplant that could provide about 800 kWe (ref. i).
The powerplant concept was based on the SP-100 reactor heat source and
Stirling cycle dynamic power generation: emerging technologies that are cur-
rently being developed in government-sponsored programs and are projected for
system technology validation by the late 1990's. The powerplant design has
features that are highly compatible with a human-rated lunar base from the
standpoints of nuclear safety and of potential for repair or replacement of
nonnuclear subsystems.
From a reliability design configuration perspective, the reference
powerplant consisted of a single power system composed of two serially con-
nected subsystems: a reactor subsystem and a power-generation subsystem. The
reactor subsystem consisted of a single (nonredundant) reactor unit, and the
partially redundant power-generation subsystem contained eight parallel units,
of which six were required to operate and two were spares (redundant). The
reliability path diagram for this configuration (fig. I) illustrates the non-
redundant reactor subsystem and the partial (k-out-of n) redundancy employed
in the power-generation subsystem.
In order to achieve mission success over an unspecified time period, the
single reactor unit must be operating, and at least six out of eight power-
generation units must be operating concurrently. This design was selected to
provide a reasonable combination of good reliability and low mass on the basis
of previous analyses of reactor space power systems using dynamic power con-
version subsystems (ref. 2). However, the configuration may not provide an
acceptable overall powerplant reliability especially for potentially low, or
pessimistic, estimates of reactor and power-generation subsystem unit
reliabilities.
A key issue involved in assessing the reliability of this design - and,
in general, for any power system using emerging technologies - is the estima-
tion of unit reliabilities, or failure rates, for the emerging technologies.
The lack of a substantial or relevant reliability data base for these tech-
nologies is a serious concern for powerplant designers attempting to meet a
mission reliability requirement. A potential solution to this problem, how-
ever, is available at the early conceptual design stage. By selecting a range
of anticipated reliabilities for the emerging technologies, the designer can,
through the application of combinatorial reliability theory, predict the sen-
sitivity of overall powerplant reliability to variation in powerplant design
configuration. The results can then be used to select redundancy options to
achieve high overall reliability.
This methodology yielded the following results for the reference lunar-
base powerplant. For optimistic, upper-bound reliability estimates of 0.98
for the reactor unit and 0.95 for each power-generation unit, the resulting
overall power system reliability was 0.9743 - about as high as the highest
subsystem-unit reliability estimate. For pessimistic, lower-bound reactor and
power-generation unit reliabilities of 0.90 and 0.80, the resulting overall
power system reliability was 0.7172 - significantly less than the highest
subsystem-unit reliability estimate, and even lower than the lowest subsystem-
unit reliability estimate. This result clearly illustrates the deleterious
effect of potentially low values of emerging-technology unit reliabilities on
the overall reliability of the reference powerplant design.
Becauseof concern for overall powerplant reliability, especially for
human-rated space missions, this study was undertaken to characterize power-
plant configurations that could improve overall reliability, particularly for
low estimates of emerging-technology reliability. The conflict between qual-
ity, as represented by reliability, and the outlay of resources, as repre-
sented by mass, is particularly prominent in space systems and has been the
subject of numerousstudies. This conflict cannot be circumvented, but it can
be minimized through selective design. The mathematical techniques available
to optimize redundancy and increase system reliability are well known. These
techniques rely on varying disciplines ranging from reliability to optimiza-
tion procedures. (For example, see ref. 3.) Since improvements in overall
reliability through redundancy always comeat the expense of additional mass,
it is especially important to identify and characterize a wide variety of
alternative low-mass powerplant configurations based on varying redundancy at
different system hierarchy levels.
An important aspect of this study was the development of massmodels
incorporating all the design features of the original lunar-base powerplant
concept. These models were used to estimate powerplant mass for all alter-
native powerplant conceptual designs considered, and the combined powerplant
reliability and massresults defined a matrix from which attractive configu-
ration options could be selected and evaluated. In addition, a simple
reliability-improvement criterion was developed to focus on appropriate
powerplant design selections at any level of desired powerplant reliability
over the range of expected reactor and power-generation unit reliabilities.
Thus, a method was formulated to select specific space power design configu-
rations that provide high overall reliability in combination with low mass as
a function of the unit reliabilities of the emerging technologies used.
DESIGNRELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT
The reliability of any system can generally be improved by using more
reliable componentsand/or applying distributed redundancy at one or more
levels of the system. For the conceptual designs under consideration, all
subsystem units were assumedto have given, fixed levels of reliability.
Distributed redundancy options were explored as the sole meansto improve
overall reliability. Redundancycan generally be categorized according to two
criteria: the level(s) at which redundancy is applied, and the state of the
redundant elements while the system is in operation. These criteria, and
their application to alternative lunar-base design configurations, formed the
basis for reliability improvement techniques evaluated in this study. In
addition, all redundant elements were assumedto be independent, and their
operation was described as either a "success" or a "failure" over a specified
time interval.
The reference powerplant (ref. i) design was analyzed to understand the
reliability improvements that could be realized by applying redundancy at
different levels of the system hierarchy. The reference powerplant had
redundancy solely at the subsystemunit level, and then only partially (in the
power-generation subsystem). Figure 2 depicts the reactor and power-
generation subsystem of the reference powerplant and shows the key components
of each subsystem. For simplicity, only one of the eight identical power-
generation units is shown. The reference powerplant design configuration is
described in detail next as a basis to characterize alternative design
configurations.
The reference reactor subsystemconsisted of (i) a single 2.5-MWt SP-100
reactor which included a fueled core, vessel structure, control rods and
reflectors, instrumentation, controls, an instrument-rated conical radiation
shadowshield, and a cylindrical neutron shield/bulkhead and (2) a primary
heat-transport loop which included a pump, an accumulator, and inlet and out-
let piping and manifolds. These components, with the exception of the mani-
folds, were located in a manmadesurface excavation lined with the cylindrical
bulkhead. The bulkhead was madeof boron/aluminum which provided excavation
support and shielding to limit soil activation and radiation from scattered
thermal neutrons. The lunar soil beyond the bulkhead provided ample shielding
protection for radiation-sensitive componentsand humanactivities on the
adjacent lunar surface.
The power-generation subsystem was located entirely on the lunar surface
and consisted of eight identical and independent units with two spares. Each
unit was composedof
(i) A platform to support the manifold and engines
(2) A secondary heat-transport loop including a heat exchanger built
into the Stifling engine heater head, a pump, and an accumulator(3) A 133-kWe-rated free-piston Stirling cycle engine with a linear
alternator
(4) A waste-heat transport loop including a heat exchanger built into
the Stifling engine's cold end, a pump, an accumulator, and a heat-
pipe radiator(5) Powermanagementand distribution components including an ac-to-dc
convertor, a parasitic load resistor radiator, and an electrical
transmission cable
As previously noted, this powerplant only provided a reliability of
0.7172 when low estimates of reactor and power-generation unit reliabilities
of 0.9 and 0.8, respectively, were assumed. Reliability was improved herein
by applying a variety of redundancy options to the basic design concept. The
following hierarchical definitions were used to clarify the redundancy options
at various levels.
Powerplant The powerplant consisted of either one, two, or three power
systems connected in either series or parallel to provide various forms
of system level redundancy. A powerplant output power level of 800 kWe
indicated "successful" operation.
System Each power system was composedof two series-connected subsystems:
a reactor subsystem and a power-generation subsystem. Power system output
was fixed at either 400 or 800 kWeto accommodatethe various forms of
system-level redundancy used to meet the 800-kWepowerplant requirement.
Subsystem The reactor and power-generation subsystemswere both composedof
one or more units. All units within a given subsystemwere identical and
of equal reliability, and the reliability, or success probability, of any
unit was assumedto be independent of both the number and the operational
state of the other like units.
Reactor Subsystem The reactor subsystem was composed of either one or two
parallel reactor units. Maximum unit output was limited to 2.5 MWt, and
operation down to 25 percent partial-output was assumed to be acceptable.
Power-Generation Subsystem The power-generation subsystem consisted of
multiple parallel units to provide various levels of k-out-of-n, or
partial, redundancy. Each of the n units was sized such that the
required operating power level was achieved from k units. Maximum unit
power output was limited to 400 kWe and no limit was set on minimum unit
power output.
On the basis of these definitions, an option matrix of powerplant redun-
dancy levels was established. The matrix contained 80 different design con-
figurations that employed redundancy options at the system and subsystem unit
level - 4 system-level options, 2 reactor subsystem options, and i0 power-
generation subsystem options.
The four 800-kWe powerplant system level configuration options were
(i) A single, nonredundant, 800-kWe power system operating at full power
(2) Two parallel, redundant, 800-kWe power systems, each assumed to be
operating at half power
(3) Three 400-kWe power systems, each assumed to be operating at two-
thirds power in a partially redundant (two-out-of-three) mode
(4) Two nonredundant, 400-kWe, series-connected power systems
These system-level redundancy options are illustrated in figure 3. System-
level redundancy options were not considered for power systems with smaller
outputs because of the significant anticipated powerplant mass increases.
At the subsystem level, the two reactor subsystem options included a
nonredundant, single 2.5-MWt unit operating at either full or 50-percent
power, and two fully redundant 2.5-MWt units, each operating at either 50- or
25-percent power. Power-generation subsystem options were based on partial-
to-full redundancy (k-out-of-n) configurations and ranged from two-to-ten
power-generation units including either zero, one, or two spare units. Total
subsystem power output varied with specified system power level (i.e., 400 or
800 kWe), and unit power levels also depended on the number of operating and
spare units used. For example, the smallest power-generation unit size of
58 kWe was used in a 400-kWe subsystem (seven-out-of-eight) configuration.
The largest power-generation unit size of 400 kWe (based on current design
limits for Stirling engines) was used with either a 400-kWe subsystem (one-
out-of-two) fully redundant configuration, or an 800-kWe subsystem (two-out-
of-three) configuration. Figure 4 shows a power-system-level reliability path
diagram of a fully redundant two-unit reactor subsystem serially connected to
a generic, k-out-of-n, partially redundant power-generation subsystem.
The second redundancy criterion to be defined is the operational state of
the redundant elements while the powerplant is in operation. There are three
possible operational redundancy states: active, standby, or combined
active-standby. The active redundancy operational state was previously
assumed for the reference powerplant design, and it is also assumed for all
other designs considered in this study. In this state all redundant subsystem
units are always "on" and operational at some fraction of rated capacity.
Active redundancy is quite common in complex remote systems, such as space
applications, where components are subjected to a hazardous environment. It
eliminates the need for potentially unreliable decision, startup, and switch-
ing devices that would be required for parallel elements in a state of standby
redundancy. It also eliminates the need for a controlled startup of a "cold"
unit to full capacity in the event of a failure.
Active redundancy is also justified by the present design philosophy for
most complex systems. Since redundancy is usually costly, many systems are
designed, when possible, to begin a mission by using all available system
capability. As failures occur, the performance of the system is degraded, but
vital functions can still be performed. System "failure" occurs when the per-
formance of the system falls below acceptable, or minimum, levels. This phil-
osophy is particularly applicable to a human-rated application where active
redundancy provides available system capability, and partial-power output from
a degraded system can provide power for vital life-support functions.
For this study, however, a partial-power output requirement was not con-
sidered, and system "failure" was assumed to occur when powerplant power out-
put fell below the rated capacity value of 800 kWe. In addition, there are
some unaddressed operational questions associated with active redundancy that
apply to partial-power operation. For example, in the purely active redun-
dancy mode assumed in this study, all parallel units operating at partial-
power are not only subject to the operational environment, they may also be
operating far from their design points. Although it is generally expected
that partial-power operation would lead to lower unit failure rates for the
reactor, this may not be the case for power-generation units. Because of the
limited knowledge base of the emerging technologies used in this study, these
operational questions cannot be addressed until after further analytical and
experimental evaluation.
It should also be noted that combined active-standby redundancy was not
extensively evaluated herein. However, in certain situations this type of
redundancy may increase overall reliability for systems and subsystems oper-
ating in k-out-of-n configurations. For example, reliability tradeoff studies
based on varying the relationships between operating failure rate, standby
failure rate, and the reliability of switching and startup can be more reli-
able for some combined active-standby configurations (ref. 4). However, these
analyses require additional estimates of partial-power, standby, switching,
and startup reliabilities for the various units. Given the extremely limited
reliability data base associated with the emerging technologies considered for
space nuclear power systems, evaluation of the combined active-standby redun-
dancy mode was deemed to be beyond the scope of this study and was not pursued
further. For the interested reader, the reliability characteristics and cal-
culation techniques applicable to active-standby redundancy are discussed com-
prehensively in reference 4.
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The objective of the reliability analysis was to determine the overall
powerplant reliability of the various system and subsystem configurations
investigated. Powerplant reliability was conservatively defined as the
probability of providing a specified power output (800 kWe) for a fixed
mission duration; no partial-power output states were specified.
The analysis dealt with active redundancy only, and it was assumedthat
the reliability of any active element was independent of the state of the
other elements and that all elements within a given subsystemwere identical.
Since the concern is with end-of-mission success, and it was presumed that a
required mission time was specified (although not explicitly stated), the unit
success probability could be treated as an assigned constant. That is, time
dependencywould likely play a part in the determination of a unit's success
probability, but for this analysis the reliability of a given unit was just a
specified constant.
Generalized equations for active and fully redundant parallel design con-
figurations are well documentedin standard reliability texts (e.g., ref. 5).
However, the specific reliability summationexpansion equations used for the
partially redundant (k-out-of-n) power-generation configurations investigated
are not commonlydocumentedand are included in appendix A along with a com-
plete tabulation of all powerplant, system, and subsystem reliability equa-
tions and analysis results.
The reliability analysis included twenty-six 400-kWesubsystem configu-
rations and twenty-four 800-kWe subsystem configurations. These fifty con-
figurations provided the reliability data base and system level building
blocks for the four powerplant configuration options. In addition, a set of
high and low estimates of subsystem unit reliabilities was analyzed for each
subsystem configuration to evaluate overall powerplant reliability sensitivity
to emerging technology reliability.
MASS ANALYSIS
Mass estimates were developed for the 50 subsystem design configurations.
These estimates were based on a "from-the-ground-up" mass estimation for all
components and are consistent with the mass estimates developed for the
reference powerplant (ref. i). A tabulation of subsystem mass values is
included in appendix A in conjunction with the reliability analysis results.
Detailed mass breakdowns for reactor and power-generation subsystems and units
are presented in appendix B. Reactor subsystem unit mass estimates were based
on the use of a modified 2.5-MWt SP-100 reactor for both single- and dual-
reactor subsystem design options. A description of specific reactor unit mod-
ifications required for integration with Stirling engines and operation in a
lunar surface excavation is given in reference i. Also, additional design
modifications to specific reactor subsystem elements were made to reflect the
mass savings due to partial-power operation. This was reflected in reduced
masses for radiation shields, bulkhead/shields, heat-transport loops, and man-
ifolds. Mass estimates for dual-reactor subsystem design concepts were based
on individual excavations for each reactor subsystem and included 100-percent
component redundancy (i.e., linear scaling of component mass) with the excep-
tion of the inlet and outlet manifolds. A larger shared inlet and outlet man-
ifold was assumed for dual installations with a 33-percent mass increase above
the single-reactor manifold estimate.
Power-generation subsystem mass estimates were based on linear scaling of
component masses based on variations in number of units and electrical output
per unit with the exception of the waste heat radiator and the power man-
agementand distribution elements, which were based on fixed specific mass
values of 7.8 kg/m_ and 2.1 kg/kWe, respectively. Stifling engine/linear
alternator unit massestimates were taken from a recent scaling study (ref. 6)
that provided engine/alternator specific mass as a function of electrical
power. All single-cylinder Stirling engine/alternator unit masseswere con-
servatively based on a larger ll3-percent rated power output engine to account
for uncertainty, and actual engine operating power levels were conservatively
assumed to be about 90 percent of the electrical output of the larger engine.
For example, if four engines were required to supply 800 kWe, each engine must
provide 200 kWe. However, the mass estimate for each engine was based on a
225-kWe engine operating at 200 kWe. In addition, a maximum rated output of
450 kWe (400 kWe actual) was assumed because of increased uncertainty in
engine design at larger sizes.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
On the basis of analyses carried out in this study, specific conclusions
were reached regarding selection of preferable powerplant, power system, and
subsystem configurations of lunar surface powerplants required to meet an
assigned 800-kWe electrical load at high reliability and low mass. The major
conclusion derived from this effort was that a powerplant consisting of a
single (nonredundant) power system composed of two reactor subsystem units and
at least four power-generation subsystem units, including two spares, will
provide low powerplant mass over a wide range of acceptable reliability cri-
teria and subsystem unit reliability estimates.
Of the four powerplant system design configurations investigated, the
single 800-kWe system configuration was the most attractive from a reliability
and mass perspective. This is clearly shown in figures 5 and 6, which graphi-
cally display the study results in terms of reliability versus mass for all
powerplant configurations. The four system configurations are denoted by dif-
ferent symbols, and the subsystem design configurations are defined by three
numbers. The first number denotes the number of reactor units, the second
denotes the total number of power-generation units, and the third number
denotes the number of spare power-generation units. The connecting lines
between the subsystem configuration design points are shown for clarity only;
they indicate a design commonality of similar type redundancy for both reactor
units and spare power-generation units. Actual connecting lines between sim-
ilar configuration types are truly represented by horizontal lines of constant
reliability. This type of graphic depiction will be shown in a discussion of
mass-reliability envelopes.
Figure 5 displays results for estimated optimistic reactor and power-
generation unit reliability estimates of 0.98 and 0.95, respectively, with a
minimum acceptable powerpiant reliibiiity criterion cutoff value of 0.95,
equivalent to the lower power-generation unit reliability estimate. Figure 6
displays results for pessimistic unit reliability estimates of 0.90 and 0.80
with a minimum acceptable powerplant reliability criterion cutoff value of
0.80, again, equivalent to the lower power-generation unit reliability
estimate.
It is important to note that arbitrary selection of the lowest mass
acceptable reliability system configuration at either one of the (high or low)
i0
subsystem reliability estimates will not guarantee minimum mass at an accept-
able reliability for the other subsystem reliability estimate. For example,
if an arbitrary acceptable overall powerplant reliability criterion is estab-
lished as approximately equal to or greater than the highest subsystem unit
reliability estimate, then the lowest mass powerplant configuration for the
optimistic subsystem unit reliability estimates of 0.98 and 0.95 is a single
nonredundant powerplant with either a (292) or a (241) subsystem configura-
tion. As shown in figure 5 the (292) configuration has a total powerplant
mass of 25 060 kg and provides an overall reliability of 0.9898, and the (241)
configuration has powerplant mass and reliability values of 25 260 kg and
0.9856. However, when pessimistic reactor and power-generation unit relia-
bility estimates of 0.90 and 0.80 are selected, the powerplant reliability
drops to an unacceptable value of 0.7303 for the (292) configuration (not
shown in fig. 6 because it is less than the overall reliability cutoff value)
and 0.8110 for the (241) configuration.
Therefore, minimum-mass powerplant configurations should be selected for
pessimistic estimates of emerging technology unit reliability in order to
ensure acceptable values of overall powerplant reliability. On this basis,
the lowest mass powerplant that can provide an overall reliability of approxi-
mately 0.90 (equivalent to the highest unit reliability estimate) is a single
system with a (262) configuration. This configuration provides a powerplant
reliability of 0.8921 for pessimistic subsystem reliability estimates. If
additional mass is acceptable and higher reliability is desired, the (252)
subsystem configuration increases powerplant reliability to 0.9327. This con-
figuration exhibits a total mass of 28 320 kg, which is only 6 percent higher
than the (262) configuration. If maximum powerplant reliability is desired
and mass is not overly constrained, the (242) configuration provides signif-
icant reliability improvement to 0.9631 at a powerplant mass of 32 340 kg.
The study conclusions and results discussed to this point have been based
on an acceptable powerplant reliability criterion keyed to the highest
subsystem unit reliability estimate - either 0.98 or 0.90. It is of interest,
however, to illustrate the effect of varying the acceptable reliability
criterion on the selection of minimum mass configurations for powerplant con-
figurations based on single 800-kWe power systems. This is qualitatively
illustrated in table I, which ranks the system configurations according to
mass as a function of acceptable system reliability criterion for the high and
low subsystem reliability estimates. These results illustrate the wide vari-
ation in minimum mass system design configurations that occur for different
assumptions of acceptable reliability criteria. In general, as the acceptable
reliability criterion is relaxed, the number of acceptable system configura-
tions increases and the mass ranking changes. When the acceptable reliability
criterion drops below the lowest unit reliability estimates, single-reactor-
unit configurations emerge as acceptable single-system powerplants. For
example, for optimistic unit reliability estimates, the (151) configuration
with an overall powerplant reliability of 0.9578 yields the lowest mass for a
0.95 reliability criterion. For pessimistic unit reliability estimates, the
(162) configuration with an overall powerplant reliability of 0.8110 yields
the lowest mass for a 0.80 reliability criterion.
To facilitate the process of defining a reasonable compromise of mass and
reliability, English developed an approach based on the delineation of a
reliability versus minimum mass envelope (R.E. English, 1990, NASA Lewis
Research Center, Cleveland, OH, personal communication). This graphical
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technique is illustrated in figure 7, which depicts the minimummass power-
plant configurations as a function of desired overall powerplant reliability
for both pessimistic and optimistic subsystem unit reliabilities. The figure
displays the actual reliability step function change associated with each
p0werplant configuration and provides a more realistic description of the
results for use as a design tool.
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
As a result of this study someinteresting perspectives on the charac-
teristics and selection criteria of high-reliability and low-mass lunar-base
powerplant design configurations have emerged. For example, as expected, the
wide range of emerging-technology reliability estimates used had a significant
effect on the selection of high-reliability and low-mass design configura-
tions. Powerplant designs that provided high reliability with low mass when
optimistic emerging technology reliability estimates were assumed were gener-
ally unacceptable when pessimistic reliability estimates were substituted.
Therefore, to ensure acceptable values of reliability, one should select min-
imum mass configurations on the basis of pessimistic reliability estimates.
Another interesting result of the study was that for either low or high
reliability estimates, the best combination of high powerplant reliability and
low mass occurred when redundancy was applied at the lowest level of system
hierarchy. Thus, the most attractive powerplant design concepts were non-
redundant, single-system powerplants with subsystem-unit redundancy options.
Selectien of the best redundancy option for the subsystems, however, depended
on the definition of an acceptable overall powerplant reliability criterion.
The issue of defining an acceptable overall powerplant reliability cri-
terion was addressed, and the definition of this criterion significantly
affected the selection of the best redundancy configuration for the subsystem
units. Since the calculated overall reliability of any powerplant configura-
tion is highly dependent on the emerging technology reliability estimates,
powerplant reliability is a relative value. Therefore, an acceptable relia-
bility criterion must be defined on the basis of emerging technology reli-
ability estimates. The reasonable choice appeared to be an acceptable
reliability criterion that required the overall powerplant reliability to be
equal to, or better than, any emerging technology subsystem unit reliability
estimate. However, that selection required every acceptable powerplant con-
figuration to have two fully redundant, parallel reactor units. Although
dual-unit reactors do not impose a significant mass penalty, they may have
integration and operational problems that were not fully explored in this
study. Therefore, selecting an attractive powerplant design on the basis of
an arbitrary reliability criterion may involve tradeoffs with design or oper-
ational complexity as well as with mass.
Additional perspectives into selecting the best redundancy options for
the subsystem units were gained by analyzing the effect of varying the overall
powerplant reliability criterion with estimates of emerging technology relia-
bilities. For example, with pessimistic emerging technology reliability
estimates and a corresponding reliability criterion of approximately 0.90 or
better, the lowest mass powerplant configuration consisted of a single system
composed of two fully redundant, parallel reactor units coupled to six par-
allel, partially redundant power-generation subsystem units including two
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spares. This configuration provided a powerplant reliability of 0.8921 at a
mass of 26 660 kg. If higher overall powerplant reliabilities are desired,
and additional mass is acceptable, fewer power-generation units are needed.
For example, a decrease to five power-generation units, including two spares,
provides a powerplant reliability of 0.9327 at a mass of 28 320 kg, and a
further decrease to four power-generation units, including two spares, pro-
vides the highest single-system powerplant reliability of 0.9631 at a mass of
32 340 kg.
For optimistic emerging technology reliability estimates and a corre-
sponding reliability criterion of 0.98 or better, the lowest mass powerplant,
again, consisted of a single-system configuration. However, this configura-
tion was composed of two fully redundant reactor units coupled to nine par-
tially redundant power-generation units with two spares. This configuration
provided a powerplant reliability of 0.9898 at a mass of 25 060 kg. Decreas-
ing the number of power-generation units, again, provides higher powerplant
reliability at the expense of mass, up to a maximum of 0.9991 at a mass of
32 340 kg for a four-unit power-generation subsystem with two spares.
Reducing the acceptable reliability criterion to, say, the reliability of
the lowest emerging technology subsystem unit allows single-unit reactor
subsystem configurations to be selected, with a resultant powerplant mass
decrease. For example, with pessimistic emerging-technology reliability
estimates and a corresponding reliability criterion of approximately 0.80 or
better, the lowest mass configuration was a single-system powerplant composed
of only one reactor unit coupled to six parallel, partially-redundant power-
generation subsystem units including two spares. This configuration provided
a powerplant reliability of 0.8110 at a mass of 23 360 kg. If higher power-
plant reliabilities are desired, a wide range of single-unit reactor subsystem
options are viable up to a reliability criterion of about 0.84.
For optimistic emerging technology reliability estimates and a corre-
sponding reliability criterion of 0.95 or better, the lowest mass conceptual
design was a single-system powerplant composed of one reactor unit coupled to
five partially redundant power-generation units, including one spare. This
configuration provided a powerplant reliability of 0.9578 at a mass of
21 390 kg. If higher powerplant reliabilities are desired, a wide range of
single-unit reactor subsystem options are viable up to a reliability criterion
of about 0.98.
Another useful product of this study was the delineation of the minimum
mass envelope in a plot of reliability versus powerplant mass. This approach
provides easy visualization of the best mass and reliability designs and
should be useful for future powerplant design studies.
Partial-power powerplant operation is an important area of consideration
that has only been lightly touched on in this study. A mission-planning
strategy that requires highly reliable "survival" level power will be essen-
tial for any manned planet-surface expedition. Any of the powerplant config-
urations studied herein for an 800-kWe mission success power level will
provide significantly higher reliabilities at a lower survival power level.
For example, using pessimistic reactor and power-generation unit reliability
estimates, a single-system (162) configuration which provides an overall
powerplant reliability of 0.8110 at a mass of 23 360 kg for 800 kWe, will
provide a reliability of 0.8999 at an assumed survival partial-power level of
13
400 kWe. The use of dual-reactor configurations can provide even more dra-
matic increases in survival power reliability. A single-system (262) con-
figuration at 26 660 kg, which provided an overall powerplant reliability of
0.8921 at 800 kWe, will achieve a reliability of 0.9899 at 400 kWe. These
results illustrate that reducing survival power level increases reliability in
a very comforting way; an important factor for mannedmissions in a hostile
environment. However, optimal powerplant configuration selection may change
if mission "success" is redefined to emphasize a "survival" power level.
The methodology developed in this study provided valuable insight into
the considerations required to identify and characterize high-reliability and
low-mass lunar-base powerplant designs. In general, this methodology can pro-
vide similar reliability perspectives for any space power conceptual designs
based on emerging technologies with unknown reliabilities.
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APPENDIXA - RELIABILITYANALYSIS
This appendix defines the symbols and provides the equations used in the
reliability analysis.
k
n
P
RG
RP
RR
RS
r
S
Symbols
number of successes
total number of parallel power-generation units
power-generation subsystem unit reliability
power-generation subsystem reliability
powerplant reliability
reactor subsystem reliability
system reliability
reactor subsystem unit reliability
number of spare power-generation units
Powerplant Reliability Equations
The following equations were used to calculate overall powerplant
reliability for the various levels of redundancy represented by the four
powerplant types:
Powerplant type Powerplant
reliability
Single system (nonredundant)
Two parallel fully redundant systems
Two series systems (nonredundant)
Three partially redundant (two-out-of-three) systems
RP = RS
RP = RS(2 - RS)
2
RP = (RS)
RP = 3RS 2 - 2RS 3
System Reliability Equations
The following equations were used to calculate system reliability RS
for the various levels of redundancy employed in the subsystem configurations:
RS = (RR)(RG)
where RR = r, for a single-reactor subsystem unit, or
RR = r(2 - r), for two parallel, fully redundant reactor subsystem units, and
n
RG E n != pk(l - p)
k=(n-s] (n - k) !kl
n-k
for n partially redundant, parallel power-generation subsystem units
including s spare units.
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The general summationexpansion for RG reduces to simplified poly-
nomials for the two-spares (s = 2) case.
The following table presents the polynomial expressions derived from the
summationexpansion for RGfor power-generation subsystems employing from
three-to-nine units (3 < n < 9) with two spares (s = 2):
Total numberof
parallel power-
generation units,
n
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Power-generation
subsystem
reliability,
RG
3p - 3p2 + p3
6p 2 - 8p 3 + 3p 4
10p 3 - 15p 4 + 6p 5
15p 4 - 24p 5 + 10p 6
21p 5 35p 6 + 15p 7
28p 6 - 48p 7 + 21p 8
36p 7 - 63p 8 + 28p 9
For n partially-redundant power-generation subsystems using only one spare
unit (s = i), the summation expansion reduces to
n-I n
RG -- np - (n - l)p
System Reliability and Mass Tabulation
Table II presents the matrix of reliability and mass results for single,
nonredundant system configurations at two power levels, 400 and 800 kWe, and
two levels of subsystem unit reliability.
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APPENDIXB - MASSANALYSIS
This appendix provides the detailed massbreakdown data used to generate
total powerplant mass for 400- and 800-kWesystem power outputs. It includes
separate tabulations of reactor subsystem mass, power-generation subsystem
mass, and total system mass.
Reactor SubsystemMass
Table III presents the componentbreakdownof reactor subsystem massele-
ments for 400- and 800-kWesystems using one or two reactor subsystem units.
Reactor mass values were conservatively based on a fixed thermal output of
2.5 MWt for all cases. Dual-reactor configurations are assumed to operate in
parallel at 50 percent of required power and to share a single set of inlet
and outlet manifolds with a 33-percent manifold mass penalty for additional
primary-loop piping connections.
Power-Generation Subsystem Mass
For the power-generation subsystem mass, separate estimates were made for
the Stirling engine/alternator units and the balance of the subsystem, which
included four items: heat transport loop, surface platform, radiator, and
power management and distribution (PMAD). Total subsystem mass varied
directly with the total number of power-generation units used to generate
system power levels of 400 and 800 kWe. The number of power-generation units
required to meet each system power level varied with the rated power output of
each unit and the number of spares. Stifling engine/alternator unit mass
estimates were based on the specific mass and power level relationships
obtained from reference 6.
Table IV presents the Stifling engine/alternator mass estimates as a
function of the number of required units. Mass values are shown only for the
number of required parallel units that can provide power outputs over the 400-
to 800-kWe range. Table V presents the balance-of-subsystem mass breakdown
for an 800-kWe subsystem output as a function of the number of required units.
Table VI presents the balance-of-subsystem mass breakdown for a 400-kWe sub-
system power output as a function of the number of required units. Tables VII
and VIII present the system mass breakdown for 400- and 800-kWe system power
outputs. Mass values are given for reactor and power-generation subsystems as
a function of the total number, number of spares, and the power level (kWe) of
power-generation units required to produce 400- and 800-kWe system power
outputs.
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TABLE I. - EFFECT OF ACCEPTABLE SYSTEM RELIABILITY CRITERION ON
SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION SELECTION
Acceptable
system
reliability
criterion
0.98
.95
.90
.85
.8O
Subsystem configurations of minimum-mass powerplants a
Reactor unit reliability,
0.98; power-generation
unit reliability, 0.95
(292),(282),(241),(272),
(262),(231),(252),(242)
(151),(192),(182),(141),
(172),(162),(271),(261),
(131),(251),(152),(292)
Reactor unit reliability, 0.90;
power-generation unit
reliability, 0.80
None meet reliability criterion
(242)
(b)
(b)
(b)
(262),(252),(242)
(262),(231),(252),(142),(242)
(162),(131),(152),(241),(272)
aNumbers define the subsystem configuration. The first number is the num-
ber of parallel reactor units, the second number is the total number of
power-generation units, and the third number is the number of spare
power-generation units.
ball single- and dual-reactor configurations.
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TABLEII. - MATRIXOF RELIABILITY AND MASS RESULTS
(a) System power level 400 kWe
System
configura-
tion a
Power
output of
power-
generation
unit,
kWe
System
mass,
kg
Low-end
system
relia-
bility, b
RS
High-end
system
relia-
bility, c
RS
ii0
121
131
132
141
142
151
152
161
162
171
172
182
210
221
231
232
241
242
251
252
261
262
271
272
282
400
400
200
400
133
200
i00
133
8O
i00
67
8O
67
400
400
200
400
133
200
I00
133
8O
i00
67
8O
67
ii 490
15 820
12 930
20 150
12 180
14 850
ii 960
13 440
ii 780
12 920
ii 850
12 550
12 520
14 490
18 770
15 880
23 I00
15 130
17 800
14 910
16 390
14 730
15 870
14 800
15 500
15 470
0.7200
.8640
.8064
.8928
.7373
.8755
.6635
.8479
.5898
.8110
.5190
.7668
.7172
.7920
.9504
.8870
.9821
.8110
.9631
.7299
.9327
.6488
.8921
.5709
.8435
.7966
0.9310
.9775
.9729
.9799
.9663
.9795
.9578
.9789
.9479
.9778
.9365
.9763
.9743
.9496
.9971
.9924
.9995
.9856
.9991
.9769
.9985
.9668
.9974
.9553
.9958
.9938
aNumbers define the subsystem configuration. The
first number is the number of parallel reactor
units, the second number is the total number of
power-generation units, and the third number is the
number of spare power-generation units.
bFor low estimates of reactor and power-generation
unit reliability: r = 0.90; p = 0.80.
CFor high estimates of reactor and power-generation
unit reliability: r = 0.98; p = 0.95.
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TABLEII. - Concluded.
System
configura-
tion a
131
141
142
151
152
161
162
171
172
181
182
191
192
231
241
242
251
252
261
262
271
272
282
292
b) System power level 800 kWe
Power
output of
power-
generation
unit,
kWe
400
270
400
200
270
160
200
133
160
114
133
i00
114
4OO
270
4OO
200
270
160
200
133
160
133
114
System
mass,
kg
24 660
22 320
29 040
21 390
25 020
20 850
23 360
20 660
22 400
20 720
21 960
20 610
21 760
27 960
25 620
32 340
24 690
28 320
24 150
26 660
23 960
25 700
25 260
25 060
Low-end
system
relia-
bility, b
RS
0.8064
.7373
.8755
.6635
.8479
.5898
.8110
.5190
.7668
.4531
.7172
.3926
.6639
.8870
.8110
.9631
.7299
.9327
.6488
.8921
.5709
.8435
.7966
.7303
High-end
system
relia-
bility, c
RS
0.9729
.9663
.9795
.9578
.9789
.9479
.9778
.9365
.9763
.9238
.9743
.9104
.9718
.9924
.9856
.9991
.9769
.9985
.9668
.9974
.9553
.9958
.9930
.9898
aNumbers define the subsystem configuration. The
first number is the number of parallel reactor
units, the second number is the total number of
power-generation units, and the third number is the
number of spare power-generation units.
bFor low estimates of reactor and power-generation
unit reliability: r = 0.90; p = 0.80.
=For high estimates of reactor and power-generation
unit reliability: r = 0.98; p = 0.95.
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TABLEIII. - REACTORSUBSYSTEMMASSBREAKDOWN
Element
Reactor
Instrumentation and control
Radiation shield
Bulkhead/shield
Heat transport loop
Manifolds
Total
System power output, kWe
800 400
Numberof reactors
1 2 1
760 1520 760
360 720 360
940 1880 740
770 1540 670
350 700 300
420 550 370
3600 6900 3200
1520
720
1480
1340
600
490
6150
TABLEIV. - STIRLINGENGINE/ALTERNATORUNIT MASS
Rated
power
per
unit,
kWe
65
75
90
113
130
150
180
225
300
450
Output
power
per
unit,
kWe
58
Specific
massat
rated
power,
kg/kWe
6.3
Unit
mass,
kg
410
67 6
80 6
i00 6
114 6
133 7
160 7
200 7
267
400
.4 480
.4 580
.8 770
.9 897
.i 1065
.3 1314
.7 1733
8.2 2460
9.2 4140
Rated
power
per
unit,
kWe 1
65
75
90
113
130
150
180
225
3O0
450 4140
3466
4920
8280
Mass, kg
Numberof units
3 4 5 6
3 195
3 942
5 199
7 380
12 420
3 080
3 588
4 260
5 256
6 932
9 840
16 560
2 900
3 850
4 485
5 325
6 570
8 665
12 300
2 880
3 480
4 620
5 382
6 390
7 884
i0 298
7
2870
3360
4060
5390
6279
7455
9198
8
3280
3840
4240
6160
7176
8520
9
3690
4320
5220
6930
8073
i0
4100
4800
5800
7700
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TABLEV. - BALANCEOF POWER-GENERATIONSUBSYSTEMMASSFOR800-kWeOUTPUT
Element Mass, kg
Total numberof power-generation units
Heat transport
Surface platform
Radiator
PMAD
Total, kg
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ii0 220 330 440 550 660 770
130 260 390 520 650 780 910
6240 6240 6240 6240 6240 6240 6240
1680 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680
8160 8400 8640 8880 9120 9360 9600
8 9
880 990
1040 1 170
6240 6 240
1680 1 680
9840 i0 080
TABLEVI. - BALANCEOF POWER-GENERATIONSUBSYSTEMMASSFOR400-kWeOUTPUT
Element Mass, kg
Heat transport
Surface platform
Radiator
PMAD
Total, kg
Total numberof power-generation units
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720 810
i00 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120
840 840 840 840 840 840 840 840 840
4150 4340 4530 4720 4910 5100 5290 5480 5670
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TABLE VII. - MASS BREAKDOWN OF 800-kWe SYSTEMS
(a) One spare power-generation unit
System or subsystem
400
Mass, kg
Total number of power-generation units
Power output per unit, kWe
270 200 160 133 114
l
Power-generation subsystem
Stirling engine/alternator units
Balance of subsystem
Total
System total a
With single reactor unit
With two reactor units
12 420 9 840 8 670 7 890
8 640 8 880 9 120 9 360
21 060 18 720 17 790 17 250
24 660 22 320 21 390 20 850
27 960 25 620 24 690 24 150
7 460 7 280
9 600 9 840
17 060 17 120
20 660 20 720
23 960 24 020
9 I i0
I00 90
6 930 5 800
i0 080 i0 320
17 010 16 120
20 610 19 720
23 910 23 020
(b) Two spare power-generation units
System or subsystem
Power-generation subsystem
Stirling engine/alternator units
Balance of subsystem
Total
System total a
With single reactor unit
With two reactor units
Mass, kg
400
16 560 12 300 I0 400 9 200
8 800 9 120 9 360 9 600
25 440 21 420 19 760 18 800
29 040 25 020 23 360 22 400
32 340 28 320 26 660 25 700
Total number of power-generation units
Power output per unit, kWe
267 200 160 133 114
8 520 8 080
9 840 I0 080
18 360
21 960
25 260
18 160
21 760
25 060
aMass of reactor subsystem is 3600 kg with one reactor unit and 6900 kg with two
reactor units.
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TABLE VIII. - _iASS BREAKDOWN OF 400-kWe SYSTEMS
(a) One spare power-generation unit
System or subsystem Mass, kg
Total number of power-generation units
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Power output per unit, kWe
400 200 133 i00 80 67 58
Power-generation subsystem
Stirling engine/alternator units 8 280 5 200 4 260 3 850 3 480 3 360 3 280
Balance of subsystem 4 340 4 530 4 720 4 910 5 i00 5 290 5 480
Total 12 620 9 730 8 980 8 760 8 580 8 650 S 760
System total a
With single reactor unit 15 820 12 930 12 180 ii 960 Ii 780 ii 850 iI 960
With two reactor units 18 770 15 880 15 130 14 910 14 730 14 800 14 910
(b) Two spare power-generaton units
System or subsystem Mass, kg
Total number of power-generation units
3 4 5 6 7 8
Power output per unit, kWe
400 200 133 i00 80 133
Power-generation subsystem
Stirling engine/alternator units 12 420 6 930 5 330 4 620 4 060 3 840
Balance of subsystem 4 530 4 720 4 910 5 i00 5 290 5 480
Total 16 950 Ii 650 i0 240 9 720 9 350 9 320
System total a
With single reactor unit 20 150 14 850 13 440 12 920 12 550 12 520
With two reactor units 23 i00 17 800 16 390 15 870 15 500 15 470
amass of reactor subsystem is 3200 kg with one reactor unit and 6150 kg with two
reactor units.
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Figure 1._Subsystem-level configuration for a single
reactor unit and multiple power-generation units.
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Figure 2.--Simplified schematic of lunar-base powerplant.
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Figure 3.--800-kWe lunar-base powerplant system
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Figure 4.--Subsystem-level configuration for parallel dual
reactor units and multiple power-generation units.
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Figure 5.--Reliability and mass of 800-kWe lunar-base powerplant options for a reactor subsystem unit reliability of 0.98 and
a power-generation unit reliability of 0.95. Numbers corresponding to points define the system configuration. The first num-
ber is the number of parallel reactor subsystems, the second number is the total number of power-generation units, and the
third number is the number of spare power-generation units.
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Figure 6--Reliability and mass of 800-kWe lunar-base powerplant options for a reactor subsystem unit reliability of 0.90 and
a power-generation unit reliability of 0.80. Numbers corresponding to points define the system configuration. The first num-
ber is the number of parallel reactor subsystems, the second number is the total number of power-generation units, and the
third number is the number of spare power-generation units.
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Figure 7.--Reliability and mass envelopes for 800-kWe lunar base powerplants. Numbers corresponding to points define the
system configuration. The first number is the number of parallel reactor subsystems, the second number is the total number
of power-generation units, and the third number is the number of spare power-generation units.
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others. This can be achieved through what is referred to as optimal allocation of redundancy. Significant improvement
in the reliability of any multielement system can be realized with alternative design configurations that use redundancy at
an appropriate level of the system hierarchy. However, improvements in system reliability will always come at the
expense of system mass. The approach taken in this study was to (1) develop a criterion for an acceptable overall
reliability risk as a function of the expected range of emerging technology subsystem unit reliabilities, (2) conduct
reliability and mass analyses for a diverse matrix of 800-kWe lunar-base design configurations employing single and
multiple powerplants with both full and partial subsystem redundancy combinations, and (3) derive reliability and mass
perspectives on selection of conceptual design configurations that meet an acceptable reliability criterion with the
minimum system mass increase relative to reference powerplant design. The perspectives developed in this study
provided valuable insight into the considerations required to identify and characterize high-reliability and low-mass
lunar-base powerplant conceptual designs. In general, the methodology developed can provide similar perspectives for
any space power system conceptual designs that are based on emerging technologies with unknown reliabilities.
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